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We are all textualists now, or so it has been claimed. But textualism, the prac-
tice of interpreting statutes solely by reference to their words, is often associated with 
conservative judicial outcomes. This is especially true when a focus on statutory text 
is combined with the belief that the meanings of words are fixed. This combination 
creates a sort of textualist originalism, in which judges interpret statutes in accord-
ance with what the words of a statute meant to the relevant linguistic community at 
the time of a statute’s enactment. 
In reaction to this conservative interpretive method, rejecting textualism but 
keeping an originalist commitment to fixed meanings provides one possible progres-
sive response. Rather than focusing primarily on the statute’s language, one might 
instead look to the statute’s animating logic, purpose, or potential to create certain 
moral or economic outcomes. But rejecting a focus on statutory text is not the only 
progressive response to the originalist textualist. A second approach accepts that the 
meanings of statutes derive from text but denies that statutory text has a meaning 
that is fixed and unchanging. Often, advocates of this latter approach run into dif-
ficulty specifying how and when the meanings of words used in statutes change. And 
some might worry that any such account will leave judges too much room to deter-
mine that the meanings of a statute’s words have changed, thus enabling judges to 
express their policy preferences through the act of statutory interpretation. 
This Comment addresses the second approach. It engages with a particular 
account in philosophy of language that views meanings as resulting from inferential 
connections among concepts. Inferentialism suggests that we can think of these in-
ferential connections as constitutive of meaning and thus think of meaning as in a 
real sense responsive to the on-the-ground effects of using a particular word. As those 
effects change, as new inferential connections are recognized, so too change the 
meanings of words. This Comment argues that this repeated process of changed in-
ferential significance provides us with an account of dynamic meaning that judges 
can take notice of but not impose themselves upon. It thus provides a methodology 
through which judges can read statutory text to mean something new or different 
without thereby merely expressing a political preference. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Of all the things that judges do, central to those activities is 
saying what the law is, which means saying what the words in 
statutes mean. “This is a pure question of statutory interpretation 
and thus well within the judiciary’s competence.”1 So asserts 
Chief Judge Diane Wood in Hively v Ivy Tech Community College 
of Indiana,2 in which the en banc Seventh Circuit decided that 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is sex discrimi-
nation. Courts that have considered the sex discrimination issue 
widely agree that the heart of the matter is what the words of 
Title VII3 of the Civil Rights Act of 19644 mean. While such an 
assessment of meaning may be “well within the judiciary’s com-
petence,” it is also true that, as Wood notes in her very next sen-
tence, “[m]uch ink has been spilled about the proper way to go 
about the task of statutory interpretation.”5 
This Comment engages with that normative question. Specif-
ically, it suggests that one place we can look for clues about what 
judges should do when asking what words mean is to philosophy 
of language, which provides generalizable theories about how  
concepts become meaningful at all. Semantic theory attempts to 
 
 1 Hively v Ivy Tech Community College of Indiana, 853 F3d 339, 343 (7th Cir 2017). 
 2 853 F3d 339 (7th Cir 2017). 
 3 42 USC § 2000e-2(a). The text of Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating 
against employees “because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin.” 42 USC § 2000e-2(a)(1), 2(a)(2). 
 4 Pub L No 88-352, 78 Stat 241, codified as amended at 42 USC § 2000e et seq. 
 5 Hively, 853 F3d at 343. 
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provide an account of meaning generally by telling a story about 
how symbols or sounds can be thought to have content and used 
to communicate, what that communication entails, and how com-
munication is achieved by human language users. 
This Comment puts legal writing about language in conver-
sation with a certain kind of philosophical thought about seman-
tics. This Comment proceeds in four Parts: In Part I, this  
Comment (briefly) surveys interpretive theories animating judi-
cial approaches to statutory interpretation. Part II engages with 
the Seventh Circuit’s interpretation of Title VII’s language as an 
example of those approaches. In Part III, this Comment develops 
a semantics not explicitly considered in those debates: the infer-
entialism of Professor Robert Brandom. In Part IV, having 
sketched the basic components of an inferentialist understanding, 
this Comment argues that such an understanding is in tension 
with the originalist and dynamic “judicial interpretive” argu-
ments Parts I and II consider and that various attempts at recon-
ciliation are unsatisfactory. 
This Comment argues that Brandomian inferentialism gives 
us reasons to think differently about statutory interpretation in a 
few ways: The framework rejects the dualism of making/finding 
in interpretive activity. It rejects the idea that meanings are fixed 
as a matter of semantic necessity. Most importantly, it suggests 
a certain kind of semantic externalism according to which 
language users’ grasp of concepts is not coextensive with the 
concepts’ full inferential reach. This Comment suggests that 
Brandomian inferentialism gives us powerful reasons to think 
that originalist, meaning-as-fixed theories of statutory 
interpretation must be incomplete and that there is a principled 
understanding of dynamic interpretation that does not merely 
reduce to a covert exercise of judicial lawmaking. Furthermore, to 
the extent that existing theories of statutory interpretation give 
us reason to think that the process of interpretation is 
meaningfully “dynamic”—taking account of evolving legal and 
social context—Brandom’s more general semantics puts some 
meat on those theoretical bones.6 
 
 6 Brandom himself suggests as much:  
It is clear that this model is getting at something important about case law (and 
about common law, which is case law all the way down). . . . [But t]he model 
itself provides no more than a portmanteau formulation; it sketches only the 
form of an account. . . . Important points are being made, but what is offered is 
hardly a theory—it is more like a set of reminders of questions to ask. 
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I.  INTERPRETING, GENERALLY 
Here are two ways of thinking about statutory interpretation. 
On a first, “originalist” account, the meaning of statutory terms 
is fixed.7 Whether by the public understanding of the terms in the 
statute at the time of its passage or the intentions of its ratifiers, 
originalists believe that statutes have meanings that are largely 
static. Originalism thus emphasizes a certain sort of interpretive 
passivity. To talk about meaning this way makes it out to be a 
sort of archaeological process, an uncovering of what was actually 
there in the heads of the legislators or the perfectly average  
English speaker at the time of the statute’s passage.8 In this way, 
we can understand theories emphasizing original public meaning, 
legislative purpose, or legislative intent as broadly originalist in 
the sense in which this Comment uses the term, for each under-
standing implies that meaning is essentially tied to some fixed, 
time-bound source. 
 
Robert B. Brandom, A Hegelian Model of Legal Concept Determination: The Normative 
Fine Structure of the Judges’ Chain Novel, in Graham Hubbs and Douglas Lind, eds, Prag-
matism, Law, and Language 19, 31 (Routledge 2014) (describing Professor Ronald 
Dworkin’s “chain novel” model of judicial decision-making).  
 While many theories of interpretation (Dworkin’s, Professor William N. Eskridge Jr’s 
“Dynamic Interpretation,” etc.) may reject strictly fixed textual meanings, this Comment 
argues that Brandomian inferentialism can provide a robust general semantics, of which 
dynamic legal semantics is a type. Brandom’s inferentialism also supplies a set of more 
general semantic considerations that, this Comment argues, give us philosophical reasons 
to prefer this sort of interpretive model rather than provide arguments in the realm of 
governmental design, economic analysis, or legal process. 
 7 This Comment follows Eskridge in calling an approach “originalist” when it “as-
sume[s] that the legislature fixes the meaning of a statute on the date the statute is en-
acted.” William N. Eskridge Jr, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U Pa L Rev 1479, 
1480 (1987). 
 8 Professor Brandom calls this model “communication as conveyance.” Robert B. 
Brandom, Making It Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment 479 
(Harvard 1994): 
Communicating is naturally conceived of as conveying something. According to 
such a conception, before an episode of communication takes place only the com-
municating agent possesses what is to be conveyed; after successful communica-
tion the recipient possesses it as well. . . . Communication is a way for speaker 
and audience to achieve a shared idea. 
 
. . . What the producer of a meaningful performance has initially and what in 
the case of successful communication its consumers eventually acquire is some-
thing—a content or meaning determining the significance of the remark—that 
is understood by both parties. 
In Part IV, this model of communication as conveyance is contrasted with Brandomian 
inferentialism, which does not require that inferential significance be preserved in  
communication. 
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On a second, “dynamic” account, statutory meaning is not 
static but instead changes with changes in society or the interpre-
tive community. Rather than pegging the meaning of statutory 
terms to a common understanding or set of purposes at a specific 
point in time, a dynamic account, as this Comment understands 
it, allows for the possibility of meanings that change or evolve be-
cause of changing or evolving facts or beliefs. While a purposivist 
originalist may advocate for a certain kind of statutory evolution 
to best serve the original purposes of a statute in the current con-
text, dynamic interpretation allows for statutory evolution that is 
not tied to any fixed point of reference. 
A. Originalist Interpretation 
Originalist theories of interpretation exist in many forms, but 
this Comment defines originalism as reliance on static meanings. 
A first originalist approach sees statutory meanings as fixed by 
reference to the “original public meaning” of the terms in the stat-
ute as commonly understood at the time of the statute’s ratifica-
tion.9 A second approach, “purposivism” (sometimes called inten-
tionalism) also emphasizes fixedness and attempts to read 
statutes to be consistent with the actual or presumed intentions 
(or animating purposes) of the people who passed them.10 
Each approach has adherents on the Supreme Court, but the 
unifying feature is a belief that law should be interpreted to pre-
serve stability of legal meanings. The late archoriginalist Justice 
Antonin Scalia, for example, writes in Roper v Simmons:11 “In a 
system based upon constitutional and statutory text democrati-
cally adopted, the concept of ‘law’ ordinarily signifies that partic-
ular words have a fixed meaning. Such law does not change, and 
this Court’s pronouncement of it therefore remains authoritative 
 
 9 See Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional 
Adjudication: Three Objections and Responses, 82 Nw U L Rev 226, 230 (1988). See also 
generally, Jack M. Balkin, The Construction of Original Public Meaning, 26 Const 
Commen 71 (2016). 
 10 See Earl M. Maltz, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Power: The Case for a 
Modified Intentionalist Approach, 63 Tulane L Rev 1, 6–13 (1988); Thomas W. Merrill, 
The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U Chi L Rev 1, 32–39 (1985) (applying a 
purposivist approach to the Supreme Court’s constitutional interpretation). This 
Comment uses “purposivism” broadly to refer to a focus on explicit intentions or a more 
general underlying purpose—though they are distinguishable. That distinction, however, 
does not result in either approach not being “originalist,” as this Comment understands 
the term, and thus I generally elide the distinction between the original public meaning 
and purposivism approaches. 
 11 543 US 551 (2005). 
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until (confessing our prior error) we overrule.”12 In disputing the 
majority’s interpretation of the Eighth Amendment’s proscription 
on “cruel and unusual” punishment, Scalia criticizes the majority 
for “purport[ing] to make of the Eighth Amendment [ ] a mirror 
of the passing and changing sentiment.”13 Scalia would instead 
have the Court look to “the original meaning of the Eighth 
Amendment,” advocating for reasoning about the amendment 
that is fettered to the understanding that obtained at the time of 
its enactment.14 
One asserted benefit of originalism, as Scalia’s opinion in 
Roper argues, is that it removes the individual preferences of spe-
cific judges from legal interpretation. Indeed, whenever statutory 
or constitutional text is read to command a new or different re-
sult, the originalist desire for stable and constant meanings often 
emerges. Chief Justice John Roberts, in his dissenting opinion in 
Obergefell v Hodges,15 mounts similar criticism of the majority’s 
reasoning about marriage as a fundamental right, alleging that 
“[f]ive lawyers have . . . enacted their own vision of marriage as a 
matter of constitutional law.”16 Roberts criticizes the majority 
opinion as “an act of will, not legal judgment . . . based not on 
neutral principles of constitutional law, but on its own ‘under-
standing of what freedom is and must become.’”17 A healthy re-
spect for fixed meanings, by contrast, acts as a constraint on 
judges who are merely discovering the meaning accepted at the 
time of enactment rather than imposing their own preferences on 
the text. 
Purposivism, too, proceeds by looking backward to something 
fixed: the explicit or underlying intentions or purposes of the leg-
islators that enacted a statute. And while interpretation based on 
underlying purposes has been used to justify an updated under-
standing of statutory text (because those underlying purposes 
may be served differently in different circumstances), the inter-
preter must still uncover a fixed underlying purpose and interpret 
by reference to that stable point.18 
 
 12 Id at 629 (Scalia dissenting). 
 13 Id. 
 14 Id at 608 (Scalia dissenting). 
 15 135 S Ct 2584 (2015). 
 16 Id at 2612 (Roberts dissenting). 
 17 Id (quotation marks omitted). 
 18 Richard H. Fallon Jr, Three Symmetries between Textualist and Purposivist Theo-
ries of Statutory Interpretation—and the Irreducible Roles of Values and Judgment within 
Both, 99 Cornell L Rev 685, 704–07 (2014). 
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This approach also has defenders among the Supreme 
Court’s current justices, perhaps most notably Justice Stephen 
Breyer. In National Labor Relations Board v Noel Canning,19 in 
which the Court clarified the extent of the president’s authority 
under the Recess Appointment Clause, Breyer can be read as  
advancing something like a purposivist approach in his majority 
opinion. Breyer rejects reasoning based on the actual intents of 
the framers. Noting that “some argue that the Founders would 
likely have intended the Clause to apply only to inter-session  
recesses,”20 Breyer argues that this is beside the point for statu-
tory interpretation purposes, as “[t]he question is not: Did the 
Founders at the time think about intra-session recesses?”21 Ra-
ther than focus on what the Founders actually contemplated or 
understood, Breyer stresses that the question is whether the 
Founders intended that the clause may apply more broadly “to 
somewhat changed circumstances.”22 He presents it as dispositive 
that “the Framers likely did intend the Clause to apply to a new 
circumstance that so clearly falls within its essential purposes.”23 
Thus, the issue of statutory interpretation is still being resolved 
by reference to something fixed and historical (the supposed un-
expressed intentions of the Framers), but the meaning of the 
clause need not derive from any actually contemplated intentions 
or beliefs of the Framers. Nevertheless, while our understanding 
of the meaning of the clause may evolve as new circumstances 
cause us to reconsider those preferences, the task of the inter-
preter is still largely passive. 
Originalism implies that meanings are found and not made. 
Meanings of statutes are determined by some aspect of the under-
standing of a fixed group of people at a fixed moment in time. In-
deed, Professor Lawrence B. Solum has called this constraint on 
interpretive activity the “Fixation Thesis,” which posits in the 
context of constitutional interpretation that “the original mean-
ing (‘communicative content’) of the constitutional text is fixed at 
the time each provision is framed and ratified.”24 Solum empha-
sizes that fixation is a semantic fact about the communicative 
 
 19 134 S Ct 2550 (2014). 
 20 Id at 2564. 
 21 Id. 
 22 Id at 2565. 
 23 Noel Canning, 134 S Ct at 2565. 
 24 Lawrence B. Solum, The Fixation Thesis: The Role of Historical Fact in Original 
Meaning, 91 Notre Dame L Rev 1, 6–7 (2015). 
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content of words: it affects what the words of a statute mean ra-
ther than affecting only how those words are used (their prag-
matic effect). He explains that the constraint is consistent with a 
general “fixation of conventional semantic meaning by linguistic 
facts at the time a communication occurs.”25 
But even Solum’s fixation thesis admits of “linguistic drift,” 
the idea that “[w]ords and phrases acquire new meanings over 
time.”26 This change, however, does not affect the meaning of prior 
uses of a particular word or phrase—the communicative content 
of which “is a function of the meaning at the time the communi-
cation was produced.”27 So while the words of a particular statute 
might mean something different if enacted at time one as opposed 
to time two, the meaning of any particular enacted statute re-
mains fixed at time one. 
There is perhaps one caveat to this general rule. Judge Frank 
Easterbrook, himself an unapologetic originalist, has contem-
plated circumstances in which society has drifted so far from the 
original meaning of statutory text that it is no longer useful in 
judicial reasoning. In this narrow situation, even the originalist 
may recognize a need for an active judicial role in shaping statu-
tory meanings. 
Words don’t have intrinsic meanings; the significance of an 
expression depends on how the interpretive community alive 
at the time of the text’s adoption understood those words. The 
older the text, the more distant that interpretive community 
from our own. At some point the difference [of the linguistic 
drift] becomes so great that the meaning is no longer recov-
erable reliably.28 
Still, these sorts of extreme examples are the exception rather 
than the rule and presuppose a degree of cultural and linguistic 
change not typically seen in the law.29 
 
 25 Id at 23. 
 26 Id at 17. 
 27 Id at 17–18. 
 28 Frank H. Easterbrook, Foreword, in Antonin Scalia and Bryan A. Garner, Reading 
Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts xxv (Thomson/West 2012). 
 29 Solum uses the example of changing meanings of “domestic violence” as a case of 
linguistic drift. Solum, 91 Notre Dame L Rev at 16–17 (cited in note 24). Others have 
discussed the meaning of “cruel and unusual punishment” as an example, arguing that 
“unusual” originally meant “government practices that are contrary to ‘long usage’” or 
otherwise innovative but now means something like “different from that which is gener-
ally done” or abnormal. See, for example, John F. Stinneford, The Original Meaning of 
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B. Dynamic Interpretation 
In contrast to originalist theories of interpretation, dynamic 
accounts of interpretation allow for the possibility of change in 
statutory meaning. This change applies not just to subsequent 
uses of words or phrases (as in originalist linguistic drift) but also 
to a given use. That is, while the originalist countenances linguis-
tic drift such that the words in statute X may mean something 
different if enacted at time one as opposed to time two (with the 
meaning of any particular enacted statute remaining fixed), dy-
namic interpretation allows for the possibility that the semantic 
content of statute X can be different at time two. In other words, 
it is not merely that statute X would mean something different if 
enacted today but that statute X actually does mean something 
different today than it did when ratified. 
Dynamic accounts of interpretation, too, exist in many forms. 
In Professor William Eskridge’s dynamic interpretation theory, 
[S]tatutory interpretation involves the present-day inter-
preter’s understanding and reconciliation of three different 
perspectives, no one of which will always control. These three 
perspectives relate to (1) the statutory text, which is the for-
mal focus of interpretation and a constraint on the range of 
interpretive options available (textual perspective); (2) the 
original legislative expectations surrounding the statute’s 
creation, including compromises reached (historical perspec-
tive); and (3) the subsequent evolution of the statute and its 
present context, especially the ways in which the societal and 
legal environment of the statute has materially changed over 
time (evolutive perspective).30 
While Eskridge’s approach emphasizes a balance among these 
three perspectives, he does suggest that “the more striking the 
changes in circumstances (changes in public values count more 
than factual changes in society), the greater weight the inter-
preter will give to evolutive considerations.”31 
Eskridge emphasizes the importance of the perspective of the 
particular interpreter, who must weigh the various sources of 
 
“Unusual”: The Eighth Amendment as a Bar to Cruel Innovation, 102 Nw U L Rev 1739, 
1744–45 (2008). 
 30 Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation 135 U Pa L Rev at 1483 (cited in note 7). 
 31 Id at 1496. This point evokes former Judge Richard Posner’s emphasis on the 
“lengthy interval” required before reinterpretive updating becomes an appealing possibil-
ity. See Hively, 853 F3d at 352–53 (Posner concurring). 
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statutory meaning, to statutory interpretation. The task “involves 
policy choices and discretion by the interpreter over time as she 
applies the statute to specific problems and is responsive to the 
current, as well as the historical, political culture.”32 
But Eskridge’s account focuses on the practical effects, rather 
than the semantic content, of dynamic meanings. He writes: 
Because statutes have an indefinite life, they apply to fact 
situations well into the future. When successive applications 
of the statute occur in contexts not anticipated by its authors, 
the statute’s meaning evolves beyond original expectations. 
Indeed, sometimes subsequent applications reveal that fac-
tual or legal assumptions of the original statute have become 
(or were originally) erroneous; then the statute’s meaning of-
ten evolves against its original expectations.33 
While Eskridge may accurately describe how legal actors’ use of 
statutes in legal reasoning or interpreters’ beliefs about statutory 
text change over time, Eskridge does not supply a well worked-
out account of dynamic meaning at the semantic level. This  
Comment seeks to tie that account of pragmatic change to a 
broader semantic story about how those changes in use imply se-
mantic changes in the communicative content of the statute itself. 
Dynamic statutory interpretation could also be thought of as 
proceeding incrementally—building on the interpretations and 
authoritative decisions that came before, but also shaping the en-
tire body of doctrine so that it best conforms to some moral or ra-
tional ideal.34 This view allows meaning to evolve dynamically as 
new authoritative decisions are made and our understanding of 
closely related concepts gains a new or sharper dimension. 
If originalist statutory interpretation understands meanings 
as found, this sort of dynamic approach understands meanings as 
 
 32 William N. Eskridge Jr, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation 48 (Harvard 1994). 
 33 Id at 49. 
 34 This could include, for example, Dworkin’s “law as integrity” approach, which al-
lows judges to identify principles that fit with law’s institutional history and to select the 
principle(s) that provide the best moral justification for that institutional history. See 
Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire 190–92 (Harvard 1986). One could similarly characterize 
efficiency maximizing versions of law and economics, but there the judge’s task is to min-
imize cost rather than maximize moral appeal. See, for example, Richard A. Posner, The 
Law and Economics of Contract Interpretation, 83 Tex L Rev 1581, 1589–92 (discussing 
the efficiency implications of different strategies for interpreting contracts). 
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unapologetically made—though perhaps by reference to some guid-
ing standards. Dynamic interpretation involves not “extract[ing]” 
meanings but “giving a fresh meaning to a statement.”35 
But there is a “specter of skepticism” that haunts the notion 
of a dynamic statutory interpretation.36 For we might worry that 
any purported change in the meaning of a statute (for example, 
for asserted morality- or efficiency-promoting reasons) is really 
nothing more than a dressed-up assertion of judicial power. The 
debate over the meaning of Title VII prompts the more general 
question of whether dynamic approaches to statutory interpreta-
tion must reduce to “overt or covert” judicial interpretive updat-
ing—an “entirely judge-made” meaning37 that is unresponsive to 
legal reasons characteristic of proper judicial activity. 
II.  AN INTERPRETIVE CASE STUDY: “SEX DISCRIMINATION” 
There are two ways of thinking about the meaning of the 
phrase “sex discrimination.” On a first, narrow account, “sex dis-
crimination” refers only to discrimination on the basis of biologi-
cal sex—that is, on the basis of reproductive functions. According 
to the narrow account, sex discrimination occurs when an individ-
ual is discriminated against solely because of the biological sex of 
the individual. If the discrimination occurs “against women be-
cause they are women [or] against men because they are men,”38 
 
 35 Hively, 853 F3d at 352 (Posner concurring). 
 36 Brandom, discussing the importance of semantics to legal reasoning, explains that 
semantically indeterminate legal concepts undercut the ability of law to serve as a source 
of rational justification. Brandom, A Hegelian Model of Legal Concept Determination at 20 
(cited in note 6): 
It is essential to the normative bindingness of applications of legal concepts to 
particular cases that those applications can be rationally licensed by laws artic-
ulated by those concepts. Insofar as legal concepts are (whether for global, sys-
tematic reasons or local, contingent ones) semantically indeterminate in a way 
that precludes their functioning appropriately in justifications of legal decisions, 
one would be obliged to adopt a form of legal realism about those decisions that 
is indistinguishable from legal nihilism. For the idea that there is a difference 
between exercising normative authority by appeal to law and simply exercising 
power in its name depends on the possibility of distinguishing applications of 
the law that are rationally justifiable in virtue of the meanings of the concepts 
that articulate the law and those that are not. 
We might worry that some forms of dynamic interpretation provide just such a local, con-
tingent source of semantic indeterminacy that leads merely to “exercising power in [law’s] 
name” in the way that Brandom identifies. Id. 
 37 Hively, 853 F3d at 360, 373 (Sykes dissenting). 
 38 Ulane v Eastern Airlines, Inc, 742 F2d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir 1984). The court uses 
“women” to refer to females and “men” to refer to males. 
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rather than at some other level of descriptive specificity, then we 
have a case of sex discrimination on the narrow understanding. 
On a second, broader account, “sex discrimination” refers to 
a general class of discriminatory behavior that includes discrimi-
nation on the basis of reproductive functions and also certain as-
sociated concepts and behaviors. According to the broader ac-
count, sex discrimination is best thought of as a genus of 
discriminatory activity that comprises several species. Even if 
discrimination “against women because they are women [or] 
against men because they are men”39 came first in the evolution-
ary lineage of the concept, there are now related forms of discrim-
ination that count as sex discrimination, including discrimination 
on the basis of sexual orientation. 
The goal of this Part is to understand how courts have ana-
lyzed and understood “sex discrimination” as it relates to Title VII. 
To that end, this Part begins by briefly summarizing some of the 
Title VII cases in order to reject a broader understanding of “sex 
discrimination.” This Part then examines Hively as an example of 
various approaches to statutory interpretation in action. 
A. “Sex Discrimination” and Title VII, Historically 
From the 1970s to the present, circuit courts have considered 
whether and how discrimination on the basis of sexual orienta-
tion fits within Title VII. The Supreme Court first recognized an 
enlarged understanding of “sex discrimination” in Price  
Waterhouse v Hopkins.40 There, a woman brought a retaliation 
claim, alleging she had been denied partnership because she 
failed to conform to stereotypical expectations of female behav-
ior.41 The Court found the claim cognizable under Title VII, recog-
nizing that traditional sex discrimination includes discriminating 
against an individual who fails to adhere to gender stereotypes.42 
The Court reasoned that Title VII clearly made gender an “imper-
missible motive” in adverse treatment and that, “[i]n the specific 
context of sex stereotyping, an employer who acts on the basis of 
a belief that a woman cannot be aggressive, or that she must not 
be, has acted on the basis of gender.”43 
 
 39 Id. 
 40 490 US 228 (1989). 
 41 Id at 235–37. 
 42 Id at 250. 
 43 Id. 
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After the Price Waterhouse decision, circuit courts attempted 
to walk a fine line: the only way those with gender variance or 
homosexual orientation can have an actionable claim is when 
they are stereotyped on the basis of sex. Thus, gay and lesbian 
employees “may nonetheless bring suit when discriminated 
against on the basis of [stereotypes of] his or her sex.”44 The near-
universal adoption of this approach among circuits sets the stage 
for Hively. 
B. Interpretive Approaches in Hively 
In April 2017, the Seventh Circuit ruled that Title VII 
protects employees from discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation.45 In so doing, the Seventh Circuit interpreted 
discrimination on the basis of “sex” in the statute’s language to 
include sexual orientation discrimination: “[W]e conclude today 
that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is a form of 
sex discrimination.”46 
Kimberly Hively, a part-time adjunct faculty member at a 
community college in Indiana, claimed that the college did not re-
new her contract because she identified as a lesbian.47 Hively sued 
her former employer, claiming that discrimination on the basis of 
sexual orientation is prohibited under Title VII as discrimination 
“on the basis of . . . sex.”48 Consistent with Seventh Circuit prece-
dent, that claim was initially dismissed49 before the court agreed 
to rehear the case en banc to reconsider the status of sexual ori-
entation discrimination claims under Title VII.50 
1. The majority opinion. 
Chief Judge Wood’s majority opinion for the en banc court 
presents the issue as one of statutory interpretation. The opinion 
considers two lines of argument: first, using “the tried-and-true 
comparative method in which we attempt to isolate the signifi-
cance of the plaintiff’s sex to the employer’s decision”; and second, 
 
 44 Doe v City of Belleville, 119 F3d 563, 593 (7th Cir 1997). 
 45 Hively, 853 F3d at 340–41. 
 46 Id at 341. 
 47 Id. 
 48 Id at 340, citing 42 USC § 2000e-2(a). 
 49 Hively v Ivy Tech Community College of Indiana, 2015 WL 926015, *3 (ND Ind). 
See also Hively v Ivy Tech Community College of Indiana, 830 F3d 698, 699 (7th Cir 2016) 
(affirming the district court’s dismissal of Hively’s claim). 
 50 Hively, 853 F3d at 343. 
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an argument concerning a right to intimate association relying on 
Loving v Virginia51 and its progeny.52 
Wood’s discussion of the comparative method analysis begins 
with the assertion that, if Hively had been a man married to a 
woman rather than a woman married to a woman, her employer’s 
actions would have been different.53 Thus, because the employer 
would treat a man married to a woman differently than Hively (a 
woman married to a woman), the employer has engaged in dis-
crimination because of sex. But the dissent criticized this ap-
proach on the grounds that it actually conflates two variables in 
the comparison: sex and sexual orientation.54 The majority re-
sponds that such a criticism “begs th[e] question” because it as-
sumes that consideration of sexual orientation is separable from 
pure sex discrimination, which was precisely the question before 
the court.55 But because consideration of sexual orientation dis-
crimination requires the court to know the sex of the plaintiff, it 
is not clear that sexual orientation discrimination can be neatly 
separated from pure sex discrimination in this way.56 The major-
ity also responds by noting that gender stereotyping was ruled 
impermissible under Title VII in Price Waterhouse and argues 
that “Hively represents the ultimate case of failure to conform to 
the female stereotype.”57 
The majority also pursues a line of argument based on the 
right to intimate association and Loving. The logic is that, just as 
discrimination against employees for associating with a person of 
a different race is illegal under Title VII, so too is discrimination 
against employees for associating intimately with a person of a 
specific sex.58 The majority notes that the Supreme Court’s ruling 
in Loving helps us understand that miscegenation laws “are (and 
always were) inherently racist.”59 The majority claims that this 
insight applies to the sexual orientation claim at issue in Hively.60 
 
 51 388 US 1 (1967). 
 52 Hively, 853 F3d at 345. 
 53 See id at 346–47. 
 54 Id at 365–67 (Sykes dissenting). 
 55 Id at 347. 
 56 Hively, 853 F3d at 350 (“It would require considerable calisthenics to remove ‘sex’ 
from ‘sexual orientation.’”). 
 57 Id at 346. 
 58 Id at 347–49. 
 59 Id at 348. Wood’s assertion that miscegenation laws “always were” racist previews 
the semantic externalism arguments discussed below. See note 113 and accompanying 
text. 
 60 Hively, 853 F3d at 349. 
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In both lines of argument, the majority relies on methods of 
statutory interpretation that trace out the implications of other 
authoritative, precedential reasoning and that attempt to harmo-
nize the inferential consequences of that reasoning with the pre-
sent case. This tracing of a controlling, rational, precedential 
story through the case law is meant to undergird the court’s ap-
plication of similar principles in the instant case. 
2. The Posner concurrence. 
In a notable concurrence, former Judge Richard Posner pro-
poses a different interpretive tack, which he suggests “may be 
more straightforward.”61 Posner asserts that statutory interpre-
tation “comes in three flavors”: the “extraction of the original 
meaning,” “interpretation by unexpressed intent,” and “giving a 
fresh meaning to a statement.”62 Posner claims that the first of 
these options, “extraction,” “corresponds to interpretation in ordi-
nary discourse.”63 The second mode, “interpretation by unex-
pressed intent” is discussed by reference to cases in which the 
meaning of a statement is informed by knowledge of the conse-
quences desired by the speaker.64 To use William Blackstone’s ex-
ample, “whoever drew blood in the streets should be punished 
with the utmost severity” is understood not to apply to surgeons 
aiding the sick.65 And finally, the third of Posner’s flavors, “giving 
a fresh meaning to a statement,” is discussed in relation to 
Hively.66 Posner explains, “Statutes and constitutional provisions 
frequently are interpreted on the basis of present need and pre-
sent understanding rather than original meaning.”67 Posner ad-
vocates for deciding Hively by appealing to this interpretive tech-
nique of “judicial interpretive updating.”68 Posner questions the 
majority’s argument that sex discrimination can encompass  
 
 61 Id at 352 (Posner concurring). 
 62 Id. The first two of these flavors, “extraction of original meaning” and “interpreta-
tion by unexpressed intent,” more or less correspond to the types of originalism developed 
above in Parts I.A and I.B, respectively. 
 63 Id at 352 (Posner concurring). 
 64 Hively, 853 F3d at 352. 
 65 Id, citing William Blackstone, 1 Commentaries on the Laws of England 60  
(Chicago 1979). 
 66 Hively, 853 F3d at 352 (Posner concurring). 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id at 353. 
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discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation absent such up-
dating given that “sex” as understood at the adoption of Title VII 
meant biological sex, not sexual orientation.69 
Posner, too, mentions some changed circumstances that war-
rant updating the court’s understanding of the meaning of  
Title VII. He cites to Obergefell v Hodges,70 in which the Supreme 
Court held that there is a fundamental right to marry and re-
ferred to changing biological and social understandings of homo-
sexuality. Toward the end of his concurrence, he writes: 
The most tenable and straightforward ground for deciding in 
favor of Hively is that while in 1964 sex discrimination meant 
discrimination against men or women as such and not 
against subsets of men or women such as effeminate men or 
mannish women, the concept of sex discrimination has since 
broadened.71 
3. The Sykes dissent. 
Finally, Hively features a dissent written by Judge Diane 
Sykes in the style of original public meaning originalism. Sykes 
agrees that the issue before the court is “one of statutory inter-
pretation,” and she begins her opinion by stressing the logic 
grounding her originalist approach: 
When we assume the power to alter the original public mean-
ing of a statute through the process of interpretation, we as-
sume a power that is not ours. The Constitution assigns the 
power to make and amend statutory law to the elected repre-
sentatives of the people. However welcome today’s decision 
might be as a policy matter, it comes at a great cost to repre-
sentative self-government.72 
Sykes’s originalism also stresses the fixation thesis: Sykes is 
interested in what “a reasonable person competent in the English 
language would have understood” Title VII’s language to mean 
and cites to public, general use dictionaries’ definitions of “sex” to 
make her interpretive case.73 The meaning of Title VII is insepa-
rable, on Sykes’s view, from this archaeological question of the 
 
 69 Id. 
 70 135 S Ct 2584 (2015). 
 71 Hively, 853 F3d at 356 (Posner concurring). 
 72 Id at 360 (Sykes dissenting). 
 73 Id at 362–63. 
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meaning of the words at the time of enactment. Sykes further em-
phasizes that the meaning of Title VII’s statutory terms are fixed 
by “public” meanings.74 There are two ways in which this is true: 
meaning is fixed by reference to a member of the public’s under-
standing, and the statutory concept itself (“sex”) is public rather 
than narrowly specialized. 
* * * 
The opinions in Hively exemplify the legal world’s grappling 
with various approaches to interpreting the meaning of “sex 
discrimination.” Proponents of the broader meaning of sex 
discrimination tend to advance versions of the arguments made 
by Wood, emphasizing cultural and legal shifts since the adoption 
of Title VII in 1964 that inform the reading of the statute’s text 
and suggest that refusing to make sexual orientation 
discrimination cognizable under Title VII is inconsistent with 
Price Waterhouse, Loving, and Obergefell.75 Those who favor a 
narrow reading tend to coalesce around an originalist 
understanding that focuses on statutory meaning as fixed at the 
time of adoption and emphasizes the common public 
understanding of “sex.”76 Further, advocates of the originalist 
position may, as Sykes did, point to Posner’s concurrence in 
Hively to argue that, if judges endorsing a broader understanding 
of sex discrimination are intellectually honest, they must admit 
to impermissibly rewriting Title VII as they see fit.77 
III.  BRANDOMIAN INFERENTIALISM 
Here are two ways of thinking about meaning.78 On a first, 
representationalist account, a sentence’s meaning is explained by 
the conditions under which it is true. This account takes truth, 
along with a notion of reference, as semantic primitives. What 
words do, according to the representationalist, is represent. That 
 
 74 Id at 362. 
 75 See, for example, Matthew W. Green Jr, Same-Sex Sex and Immutable Traits: Why 
Obergefell v. Hodges Clears a Path to Protecting Gay and Lesbian Employees from Work-
place Discrimination under Title VII, 20 J Gender, Race & Just 1, 36–39 (2017). 
 76 See generally, for example, Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Zarda 
v. Altitude Express, Inc, No 15-3775 (2d Cir filed July 26, 2017) (making similar arguments 
in favor of a narrow understanding of “sex discrimination”). 
 77 See note 36 and accompanying text. 
 78 “There, then, are two ways of thinking about various things.” Richard Rorty, Phi-
losophy as a Kind of Writing: An Essay on Derrida, 39 New Lit Hist 101, 103 (2008). 
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is, they stand in for parts of the world. Words can be combined 
such that they represent the world truly. That is, they get the 
parts of the world that they represent correct in some way.79 For 
the representationalist, reference and truth are primitive in that 
they name the basic or fundamental aspects of the linguistic en-
terprise—elements not themselves analyzable in yet more funda-
mental parts.80 
On a second, inferentialist account, a sentence’s meaning is 
explained by the inferential relationships that obtain between 
that sentence and other sentences in the language. One way to 
motivate such an account, pursued by Professor Brandom, is to 
adopt a pragmatic approach—taking as basic an account of the 
act of asserting in order to explain what has thereby been as-
serted.81 Explanatory priority is given to pragmatics over seman-
tics. The act of making a claim is rational—that is, takes place 
within the space of reasons82—if it includes appreciation of at 
least some of the inferential consequences associated with the act 
of claiming. The functional role of a sentence is thus normatively 
defined—asserting the sentence implies a certain responsibility 
on the part of the asserting subject according to norms of material 
inference. What is primitive, on this account, is not reference and 
truth but inference—the basic, necessary ingredient of any ra-
tional asserting subject within a language game.83 Reference and 
truth emerge from this more basic inferential unit. 
The aim of this Part is to understand Brandom as providing 
answers to some basic philosophical questions: What is it to be 
rational? How do our concepts become contentful? What is the 
role of community and society in our discursive activity? These 
are, needless to say, extremely broad and contentious questions 
with a long history of philosophical and legal thought devoted to 
supplying them answers. This Comment’s goal is not to do justice 
to the depth of that scholarly tradition. Nor is it to attempt a novel 
 
 79 See Jeremy Wanderer, Robert Brandom 96 (McGill-Queen’s 2008). 
 80 See generally, for example, Gottlob Frege, On Sense and Reference (Max Black, 
trans), in Peter Geach and Max Black, eds, Translations from the Philosophical Writings 
of Gottlob Frege 56 (Basil Blackwell 1960). But see Brandom, Making It Explicit at 94 
(cited in note 8) (explaining that, although Gottlob Frege is “usually thought of as the 
father of the contemporary way of working out the representationalist order of explana-
tion,” one could “read . . . back into Frege” inferentialist themes). 
 81 Robert B. Brandom, Reason in Philosophy: Animating Ideas 40–41 (Harvard 2009). 
 82 Id at 10. 
 83 See id at 95–99 for further discussion of the representationalist and inferentialist 
distinction. See also Part III.B, which describes in detail one such language game.  
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summary of Brandomian inferentialism. Rather, it attempts to 
develop some general themes of Brandom’s semantics in order to 
see how those themes inform our thought about how words such 
as “sex” in Title VII should be understood. 
A. Rationality 
To begin, it is helpful to understand what Brandom means by 
“rationality” and how he sees us, concept-wielding language  
users, as distinctively rational. Brandom identifies Immanuel 
Kant’s thought as a tipping point in the history of philosophy be-
cause of Kant’s reconceptualization of the category of mental ac-
tivity and judgment.84 Whereas prior philosophy had been con-
cerned with judgment-as-predication—rational activity as 
defined by predication (categorizing objects correctly, understood 
as a relational activity)—Brandom reads Kant as understanding 
judgment as defined by responsibility (understood as a normative 
activity).85 That is, to be rational is not properly understood as 
ontological possession of a thing (a mind) that allows one to clas-
sify objects but as being responsible to a realm of deontological 
assessment. 
A rational agent, on this view, is one that is bound by norms. 
Rationality involves “committing ourselves . . . [and] making our-
selves subject to assessment according to rules that articulate the 
contents of those commitments.”86 To be rational, and to wield con-
cepts, critically involves not just knowing what (classifying ob-
jects) but also knowing how to do something. To clarify this idea, 
Brandom uses the example of a parrot that is trained to respond 
differentially to red things by squawking “[t]hat’s red.”87 On the 
judgment-as-predication view, being able to reliably differentially 
respond to red objects might be thought to be applying the concept 
“red.” Not so on a normatively conceived understanding of judg-
ment: the parrot’s behavior does not rise to the level of rational 
judgment precisely because it lacks a dimension of normative as-
sessment; the parrot could not offer reasons for its classification. 
That is, in order to count as applying the concept “red” under the 
Brandomian view, a language user must not only reliably classify 
 
 84 Id at 29–33. 
 85 Brandom, Reason in Philosophy at 33 (cited in note 81). 
 86 Id. 
 87 Brandom, Making It Explicit at 88 (cited in note 8). 
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red things but also be able to make inferences. To make a judg-
ment, a language user must understand the inferential relation-
ships between the concept “red” and other concepts (being “col-
ored,” not compatible with being “green,” etc.).88 
Brandom describes this as the difference between “sentience” 
and “sapience.”89 Sentience is a biological trait, whereas sapience 
involves normative assessment.90 Sapience requires the concept 
user to supply reasons for what she does and to submit herself to 
assessment in terms of those reasons. Applying concepts, which 
is to say “giving and asking for reasons,” characterizes truly sapi-
ent discursive activity.91 As Brandom writes, 
The space of reasons is the space of concepts. What discursive 
beings do is apply concepts. . . . Such discursive activity is the 
exercise of a distinctive kind of consciousness. . . . For it de-
pends on the sort of conceptual understanding that consists 
in practically knowing one’s way about in the inferentially 
articulated space of reasons and concepts, rather than the 
sort of organic feeling we share with animals that are not ra-
tional animals.92 
Brandom characterizes this understanding of judgment as 
Kant’s “next big idea” in the history of philosophy: viewing the 
normative commitment undertaken through judging as a “task 
responsibility” to do something.93 Specifically, Brandom thinks 
that we can characterize discursive activity as the undertaking of 
commitments—taking on a rational responsibility to provide rea-
sons for one’s actions (justification), to acknowledge inferential 
consequences of those reasons (amplification), and to root out in-
compatibility among commitments undertaken (critical activ-
ity).94 A concept user, “a rational self,” can be seen as a web of 
interactions among commitments undertaken, which in turn en-
tail and preempt the endorsement of other commitments.95  
Brandom, following Kant, refers to this integrative, reweaving, 
rational agent as an “original synthetic unity of apperception” and 
 
 88 Id at 88–89. 
 89 Brandom, Reason in Philosophy at 135 (cited in note 81). 
 90 See id. 
 91 Id at 8. 
 92 Id at 10. 
 93 Brandom, Reason in Philosophy at 35 (cited in note 81) (emphasis omitted). See 
also Brandom, Making It Explicit at 172–73 (cited in note 8). 
 94 Brandom, Reason in Philosophy at 36 (cited in note 81). 
 95 See id at 11–14. 
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distinguishes the discursive, deontic activity of apperception from 
mere labeling, perceptive activity.96 
For Brandom then, the paradigm of rational activity is con-
cept application, which involves a responsibility to integrate the 
concept into a “constellation” of related concepts connected to 
each other inferentially.97 
B. Social Linguistic Activity 
This integrative activity extends not just to an individual’s 
conceptual commitments but also serves as the foundation for a 
general account of linguistic activity. Justification, amplification, 
and critical activity all structure the apperceiving individual’s ra-
tional activity. Taking this constellation into the interpersonal 
realm, shared among language users, provides the basic structure 
of Brandom’s linguistic account. 
To illustrate, Brandom describes linguistic practice as a cer-
tain kind of game.98 Imagine a game with a basic structure that 
involves a gameplayer and a scorekeeper. The game involves a 
large number of different token types available to be played by 
the gameplayer. The gameplayer makes a move by taking one of 
the token types and placing it in front of her. Think of this as 
undertaking a commitment to that token. This activity is noted 
by the scorekeeper, who records the commitments undertaken by 
the gameplayer. These commitments can also be disavowed: the 
gameplayer does this by removing the relevant token from in 
front of her. 
Suppose further that various inferential relationships hold 
among the tokens. This complicates the job of the scorekeeper, who 
notes not only those tokens that the gameplayer has played di-
rectly (her commitments), but also keeps track of those tokens that 
are permissible and incompatible with the commitments of the 
gameplayer. That is, a gameplayer’s playing a token of a given type 
will rule out the possibility of legitimately playing some other to-
 
 96 Id at 37. Apperception is the process of integrating a concept or commitment into 
the broader constellation of commitments one holds. Brandom emphasizes the “synthetic 
unity” of apperception because there is an active synthesis of concepts by the rational 
agent that produces a unified web of concepts subject to norms of criticism, amplification, 
and justification. 
 97 Id at 41. 
 98 This is the heart of Brandom’s inferential account in Making It Explicit. For a 
summary, see Wanderer, Robert Brandom at 41–53 (cited in note 79). 
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kens—one cannot be committed to the former while also being en-
titled to play the latter. Further, the scorekeeper can note those 
tokens that the gameplayer could play while remaining consistent 
with her current commitments. We could think of those tokens as 
ones that the gameplayer is entitled to. Entitlement is not a basic 
move that the gameplayer can make herself. Instead, entitlements 
flow from the more basic commitments that a gameplayer under-
takes. Entitlements can be the direct result of a basic commitment 
or flow permissively from yet other entitlements. Furthermore, a 
gameplayer with commitments judged to be incompatible will cor-
respondingly be judged entitled to neither. A scorekeeper can chal-
lenge these commitments, calling on the gameplayer to resolve the 
incompatibility or face normative sanction.99 
These inferential connections will start to map out the “space 
of reasons”100 for an individual gameplayer. But the game as it is 
described above is also interpersonal. It involves individual game-
players keeping score on one another. This perspectival nature101 
means that the act of scorekeeping may vary subtly based on the 
perspective of the scorekeeper in question and what commit-
ments, entitlements, and incompatibilities she associates with a 
given token. Further, gameplayer and scorekeeper are roles each 
participant in the game plays at the same time by giving and ask-
ing for reasons. 
Because gameplayers are also scorekeepers (not only of oth-
ers, but of themselves, keeping track of their own commitments 
and entitlements), the interpersonal act of scorekeeping may have 
consequences for the intrapersonal moves one makes as a game-
player. If one keeps score on a gameplayer, and the player makes 
a move to which she is both committed and entitled, and there are 
 
 99 For more on challenging, see generally Jeremy Wanderer, Brandom’s Challenges, 
in Bernhard Weiss and Jeremy Wanderer, eds, Reading Brandom: On Making It Explicit, 
96 (Routledge 2010). 
 100 Brandom, Making It Explicit at 5 (cited in note 8). 
 101 The game is “perspectival” in that “it essentially involves a distinction of social 
perspective, between what one is doing in acknowledging a commitment (oneself) and at-
tributing a commitment (to someone else).” Robert Brandom, Reply to Allan Gibbard’s 
“Thought, Norms, and Discursive Practice”, in Weiss and Wanderer, eds, Reading  
Brandom 297, 298 (cited in note 99). The game is thus “social” in what Brandom calls an 
“I-thou” sense because of this distinction between the scorekeeping/acknowledgement and 
gameplaying/attribution perspective. “I-thou” sociality can be contrasted with “I-we” con-
ceptions of the social, which involve a distinction between an individual and a broader 
community. Id at 297–300.  
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no incompatible commitments held by the scorekeeper, the score-
keeper gains an entitlement to the claim.102 This is because as-
criptions of entitlements always occur from the scorekeeper’s per-
spective. That is, in tracking a gameplayer’s entitlements and 
incompatibilities, the scorekeeper has to rely on her judgment, on 
what she takes the inferential consequences of the actual commit-
ments of the gameplayer to be. Crucially, the shape of those 
acknowledged relationships will vary from scorekeeper to score-
keeper.103 Indeed, because gameplayers also keep score on them-
selves, a scorekeeper will likely recognize some consequences of 
the tokens she plays but also fail to recognize others.104 The exact 
shape of the entitlement and incompatibility consequences that 
result from a gameplayer’s tokening will vary depending on the 
identity of the specific scorekeeper in question. 
C. Determinateness and Changing Meaning over Time 
The story that Brandom tells also seeks to explain what he 
calls the “determinateness” of concepts.105 Because the specific 
shape of a gameplayer’s commitments (her entitlements and in-
compatibilities) depends on the judgment of the scorekeeper, we 
might start to worry about the move from the actual practices of 
scorekeepers to a determinate content that can be associated with 
a concept. For one, inferential role is intelligible only when a spe-
cific scorekeeper updates the score. For another, regardless of 
how many instances of scorekeeping activity there are, they will 
underdetermine the number of material inferential consequences 
that are appropriately associated with a given tokening.106 
The activity of updating the score associated with a given to-
kening by a gameplayer might differ from scorekeeper to  
scorekeeper based on the auxiliary sentences that the scorekeeper 
 
 102 See Brandom, Making It Explicit at 185–91 (cited in note 8). 
 103 Id at 185. 
 104 To see this discrepancy, remember that a gameplayer, who keeps score on herself, 
will assign to herself some set of entitlements and incompatibilities given her commit-
ments. Her self-assigned set of inferential consequences may not match those assigned 
based on other scorekeepers’ standards of correctness. This possibility—that the commit-
ments of a gameplayer entail commitments of which the gameplayer is not herself aware—
will become important for thinking about scorekeeping activity in judging. See note 119–
21 and accompanying text. 
 105 Brandom, A Hegelian Model of Legal Concept Determination at 19 (cited in note 6). 
 106 See Wanderer, Robert Brandom at 202–06 (cited in note 79) (explaining that 
multiple possible understandings of appropriateness could characterize the instances of 
scorekeeping). 
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considers when assigning commitments, entitlements, and in-
compatibilities. To the extent that two different scorekeepers per-
form their activities differently in response to a tokening by a 
given gameplayer (that is, a concept deployed by a gameplayer), 
does the tokening have two different meanings? If it does, we 
might worry about the implications for the possibility of commu-
nication among participants in the game: if the meaning of a sen-
tence differs based on all of the associated connections between 
the sentence and other sentences, then it seems unlikely that any 
two people will ever mean the same thing when they use a given 
tokening.107 
This is one big takeaway from how Brandom says we should 
think about meaning: the challenge above seems to want to de-
scribe something concrete—a conceptual content—that each par-
ticipant in the linguistic practice has access to individually.108 But 
Brandom says that meanings are not little packets, all alike, to be 
copied and distributed to each of the members of a linguistic prac-
tice.109 Instead, communication is a social enterprise that succeeds 
because each participant in the enterprise does something differ-
ent. Like partners in a dance, the communication emerges from the 
coordinated—but different—activity of the participants.110 While 
the partners in communication may not “share” some fixed and de-
terminate thing (a meaning), their interaction counts as successful 
communication insofar as they can coordinate their activity to-
gether. This type of coordination need not require an exact match 
between the inferential consequences of concept application recog-
nized by each scorekeeper/gameplayer.111 
Brandom also endorses semantic externalism. What counts as 
a correct “move” in the communicative dance depends on stand-
ards that are external to the judgment of any individual partici-
pant. The gameplayer, when she undertakes a commitment, is 
thus meaningfully accountable to normative conceptual stand-
ards. Brandom writes: 
The norms I am binding myself to by using the term “molyb-
denum”—what actually follows from or is incompatible with 
the applicability of the concept—need not change as my views 
about molybdenum and its inferential surround change. And 
 
 107 See id at 146–47. 
 108 Recall “communication as conveyance.” See note 8. 
 109 See Wanderer, Robert Brandom at 152–53 (cited in note 79). 
 110 See id. 
 111 See note 104. 
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you and I may be bound by just the same public linguistic and 
conceptual norms in the vicinity in spite of the fact that we 
are disposed to make different claims and inferential moves. 
It is up to me whether I play a token of the “molybdenum” 
type in the game of giving and asking for reasons. But it is 
not then up to me what the significance of that move is.112 
Through this notion of external, public standards of correct 
or incorrect application of conceptual norms, Brandom is trying 
to carve out a sense in which inferentialism can still be held com-
patible with a sort of determinate stability. With “molybdenum,” 
this sort of objectivity is achieved by making the standards for 
correct or incorrect application independent of the views of any 
single gameplayer/scorekeeper and resting them instead on an in-
dependent expert consensus. In this way, a language user who 
employs a given concept can still do so correctly or incorrectly 
even if she does not recognize an incorrect application when keep-
ing score on herself. 
While the norms structuring a given account of conceptual 
content provide a sort of objectivity, those norms can clearly 
change and evolve over time. Current participants in the lan-
guage game can look back on past applications of concepts and 
past judgments surrounding inferential consequences and trace 
through that history a narrative about the norms that structure 
a concept. By acknowledging some applications as correct while 
sanctioning others, current participants both make the concepts 
in question determinate and find them to be so through their in-
terpretation of past use, knowing that they stand by this history 
of concept use just as future generations will stand by them.  
Using “copper” as his example, Brandom explains: 
A recollective reconstruction of the tradition culminating in 
the current set of conceptual commitments-and-contents 
shows, from the point of view of that set of commitments-and-
concepts, taken as correct, how we gradually, step by step, 
came to acknowledge (in our attitudes) the norms (normative 
statuses such as commitments) that all along implicitly gov-
erned our practices—for instance, what we were really, 
whether we knew it or not, committed to about the melting 
point of a piece of metal when we applied the concept copper 
to it. From this point of view, the contents of our concepts 
 
 112 Robert B. Brandom, Articulating Reasons: An Introduction to Inferentialism 29 
(Harvard 2000). 
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have always been perfectly determinate . . . though we didn’t 
always know what they were.113 
Brandom also makes this point by appealing to a specifically 
legal analogy. For, on his view, this social-integrative activity is 
exactly the sort of activity undertaken in common-law judging. 
Brandom argues that, in the common law, “[a]ll there is to give 
[concepts] content is the actual applications that have been made 
of them over the years. They are case law all the way down.”114 In 
judging a case at common law, the judge has only the precedential 
decisions of past common law cases to consult. Those precedents 
have shaped concepts relationally, defining the contours of the 
applicability of legal concepts by the inferential logical relation-
ships that hold among cases. Brandom describes the process by 
saying, 
The task in each case is to decide the applicability of some 
distinguished legal vocabulary. . . . The judge in each new 
case makes a decision, to apply or not to apply the legal con-
cept in question, given the facts of the case. . . . In this pro-
cess, each new decision, with its accompanying rationale, in-
cluding a selection of precedents, relevant considerations, 
and rules of inference and incompatibility, helps to determine 
further the conceptual content of the legal term whose appli-
cation is up for adjudication.115 
The judge in these cases operates in the context of the current 
institutional web of permitted legal inferences. The judge’s appli-
cation of a concept in new circumstances also serves to force the 
web to reweave and accommodate the new inferences that follow 
from a given application of a concept. It thus helps to shape the 
future practices of the legal community that will, in adjudicating 
future cases, incorporate the current judgment as precedential. 
In this way Brandom sees the rational integration of concepts 
as not only socially defined by linguistic communities but histori-
cally defined by those communities over time.116 Just as the cur-
rent members of a community recognize each other as fellow dis-
cursive language users, so too they recognize past instantiations 
 
 113 Brandom, A Hegelian Model of Legal Concept Determination at 36 (cited in note 6) 
(emphasis added). 
 114 Brandom, Reason in Philosophy at 84 (cited in note 81). 
 115 Id at 84–85. 
 116 See Brandom, A Hegelian Model of Legal Concept Determination at 33–38 (cited 
in note 6). 
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of the community as members having something like precedential 
authority. To justify the application of a concept is to offer a “ra-
tional reconstruction of the tradition that makes it visible as au-
thoritative insofar as, so presented, the tradition at once deter-
mines the conceptual content one is adjudicating the application 
of and reveals what that content is, and so how the current ques-
tion of applicability ought to be decided.”117 The entire process of 
integrating rational commitments into a “constellation of prior 
commitments”118 is based in this sociohistorical process of norma-
tive attitudes. 
This process implicates “determinateness” in two different 
ways: scorekeepers look retrospectively to past uses of concepts to 
inform their present judgments but are also aware that present 
judgments prospectively affect the norms that will inform future 
judgments.119 Brandom emphasizes: 
From this point of view, conceptual norms are never fully de-
terminate . . . since there is always room for further determi-
nation. The conceptual norms are not completely indetermi-
nate either, since a lot of actual applications have been 
endorsed as correct by potentially precedent-setting judg-
ments. All the determinateness the content has is the prod-
uct of that activity.120 
While this may seem to give a sort of privileged authority to the 
scorekeeper, this privilege is also administered by future partici-
pants in the game. Those participants will also, when keeping 
score, have to decide whether to take the judgments of past score-
keepers as authoritative. This is analogous to the fact that the 
common-law judge has the authority to determine the current in-
ferential shape of the legal precedent she inherits (though that 
determination remains authoritative only if the next judge, when 
faced with the same issue, chooses to treat the decision as correct 
or precedential). Future scorekeepers have the ability to recast 
the judgments made by current scorekeepers as errors or to ac-
cept them as correct.121 
 
 117 Brandom, Reason in Philosophy at 86 (cited in note 81). 
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 119 See id at 92–93. 
 120 Brandom, A Hegelian Model of Legal Concept Determination at 36–37 (cited in 
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IV.  TOWARD A BRANDOMIAN STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
This Comment argues that dynamic interpretive approaches 
map well onto Professor Brandom’s semantics. These dynamic ap-
proaches to interpretation can countenance broader conceptions 
of sex discrimination by acknowledging the inferential pull of cul-
tural attitudes, intervening Supreme Court decisions, and better 
understanding of gay and lesbian people’s experiences. This sort 
of inferential analysis fits well with a general semantic under-
standing like Brandom’s that emphasizes meaning as emerging 
from dynamic apperceptive activity (deontic scorekeeping). Fur-
ther, Brandom’s semantics suggests that originalist interpreta-
tions undergirding narrow understandings of Title VII are mis-
guided in two ways: First, such understandings improperly focus 
on statutory meanings that are found rather than made. Second, 
and relatedly, the originalist arguments presented in the debate 
surrounding Title VII suggest a rejection of the sort of semantic 
externalism typical of Brandom’s thinking. Brandom describes 
the process of semantic development as one of discovering those 
norms that all along structured our conceptual contents, whether 
or not we realized it at the time.122 This is the view that Judge 
Posner in Hively derides as “imply[ing] that the statute forbade 
discrimination against homosexuals but the framers and ratifiers 
of the statute were not smart enough to realize that.”123 
To clarify, this Comment seeks to explore the ways in which 
a Brandomian understanding of semantics can be used to support 
dynamic interpretive methods and to keep at bay concerns about 
such methods being unprincipled or mere power plays. That is, it 
argues that Brandom’s account gives the dynamic interpreter one 
story that she might tell about how the meaning of statutory 
terms can change over time. It is beyond the scope of this  
Comment to attempt any sort of evaluative or comparative se-
mantics—that is, to argue that Brandom’s semantics is in fact the 
best account of language that we currently have and that our in-
terpretive activity should be brought into conformity with  
Brandom’s account as a result. Of course, to the extent that is the 
case, that provides us with an independent reason to prefer dy-
namic interpretation to forms of originalism. But even if we are 
agnostic as to which semantic account provides us with the best 
way of talking about language, Brandomian inferentialism can 
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give us tools to help build up dynamic statutory interpretation 
into an internally coherent account with sufficient conceptual re-
sources to respond to various criticisms from originalists and to 
give force to some criticisms of its own. 
A. Brandom contra Originalism 
At first glance, there appears to be a clear conflict between 
the originalist and Brandomian approaches. Originalism empha-
sizes semantic fixation by appealing to a stable source of concep-
tual meaning. Brandomian inferentialism, by contrast, empha-
sizes the pragmatic fluidity of scorekeeping activity—tracking 
inferential connections among sentences. What semantics is for, 
in other words, is making explicit the normatively enforceable 
commitments of a certain group of gameplayers rather than pri-
marily for speaking truly or representing things in a certain way. 
Commitment to one sentence by a speaker/gameplayer becomes 
meaningful when it is recognized by a scorekeeper who updates 
the score accordingly: noting the commitment, permissive entitle-
ments, and incompatibilities that result from the move. Score-
keepers are thereby not conceived of as merely uncovering and 
observing those meanings imposed on terms by their speakers (as 
in the archaeological originalist account); rather, the activity of 
scorekeeping necessarily involves some judgment about inferen-
tial consequences that puts the scorekeeper actively at the heart 
of semantic content.124 
But perhaps a reconciliation is possible. Scorekeeping activ-
ity necessarily depends on those auxiliary hypotheses accepted by 
the scorekeeper. It is those hypotheses that determine, based on 
the acknowledged commitments of a given gameplayer, what the 
further committive consequences, entitlements, and incompati-
bilities associated with a given score will be. Prohibiting commit-
ments that would not have been accepted by an average member 
of the linguistic community at the time of a given statute’s adop-
tion may be thought to constrain an originalist judge’s scorekeep-
ing. This is not a necessary feature of judicial interpretive activ-
ity—the shape of the judge’s auxiliary commitments could be 
otherwise so as to remove this constraint if the judge was not com-
mitted to a conservative scorekeeping heuristic. But perhaps we 
ought to have this constraint in place for reasons of democratic 
government: the constraint improves the publicity of laws, makes 
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law more objective, and ensures that laws’ contents are deter-
mined by elected legislators.125 
This Comment does not argue that it can never be appropri-
ate to employ these kinds of conservative constraints on score-
keeping activity. Indeed, such a claim would be implausible on its 
face. Someone seeking to understand Paul’s epistles, for example 
by engaging with concepts like “justification” or “the law” as they 
are used in the letters, will surely need to adopt auxiliary score-
keeping hypotheses that recognize only those consequences that 
would have been accepted by a Pauline Christian.126 (Keeping 
score on Paul’s epistles based on the sort of understanding of “the 
law” that includes Title VII, for example, is likely inappropriate.) 
There, the biblical scholar really is doing a sort of finding and 
adopts some hermeneutics that reflects the desire to uncover the 
original meaning of the letter as intended by Paul.  
But importantly, note that the scorekeeping constraints 
adopted in this sort of conservative interpretation are optional 
constraints self-imposed by scorekeepers with a particular goal 
(for example, understanding what Paul intended in the epistles). 
Such constraints do not run the other way—there is nothing 
about the text itself or something external to the scorekeeper that 
would force the adoption of a conservative scorekeeping heuristic. 
This Comment does not argue that a conservative heuristic might 
not also make sense for a certain kind of legal reader; it argues 
only that the question of whether it does or not must be answered 
at the contested level of utilitarian calculus. 
Judge Sykes seems to acknowledge this in her Hively opinion. 
She frames originalism as a consequence of a certain kind of rule-
of-law concern. She argues that originalism is based in the struc-
ture of our democracy and Constitution, which is consistent with 
originalism being a contingent, optional approach to legal inter-
pretation.127 But Sykes, despite her initially more utilitarian 
framing of the originalist argument, overplays her hand when she 
writes of the relevance of the “robust debate” surrounding treat-
ment of gay and lesbian people in society: 
 
 125 See, for example, Robert H. Bork, The Judge’s Role in Law and Culture, 1 Ave 
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This striking cultural change informs a case for legislative 
change and might eventually persuade the people’s repre-
sentatives to amend the statute to implement a new public 
policy. But it does not bear on the sole inquiry properly before 
the en banc court: Is the prevailing interpretation of  
Title VII—that discrimination on the basis of sexual orienta-
tion is different in kind and not a form of sex discrimination—
wrong as an original matter?128 
For the inferentialist, there is no reason to think that considera-
tions such as original understanding necessarily do not bear on 
the question of statutory interpretation before the court. And 
that’s because the court’s interpretation is a choice of interpretive 
frames, of recognition or nonrecognition of certain auxiliary hy-
potheses that give the concept “sex discrimination” its inferential 
shape. Present cultural attitudes and original public meanings 
are both, equally, examples of the sorts of auxiliary hypotheses 
that can give our understanding of sex discrimination a particular 
inferential shape. There is no way to suppose that one is properly 
before the court while the other is off limits without begging the 
interpretive question at issue. 
Moreover, an originalist heuristic runs counter to the seman-
tic externalism urged by Brandomian inferentialist semantics. 
Sykes’s originalism points to democratic legitimacy as an im-
portant normative constraint on the scorekeeping activities of 
judges. One effect of the adoption of an originalist scorekeeping 
heuristic is that the concepts being interpreted are isolated, 
meaningfully sealed off from the ordinary public realm of concept 
use due to their specialized attendant scorekeeping considera-
tions. I take this to be what happens with something like the ex-
egesis of Paul’s epistles considered earlier: the notions of justifi-
cation or law employed there are local to the epistles and to a 
certain biblical frame of reference. Concepts employed in that con-
text, then, need not be broadly public but instead are specialized. 
We can use subscript to denote this sort of local conceptual con-
cern such that someone reading the epistles is interested in  
lawPaul rather than “law” as a public concept. Originalist statutory 
interpretation, however, is explicitly not confined to the local 
realm of legal concepts and judicial interpretation. Originalist 
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judges take themselves to be applying public concepts and so can-
not confine their concern to the local inferential realm of special-
ized legal use of the concepts in question.129 
The recollective process that Brandom describes with regard 
to “molybdenum”130 can equally be applied to Title VII and “sex.” 
Just as we historically may not have realized what we were com-
mitted to when we applied the concept “molybdenum” (for exam-
ple, that it entails melting at 4,752 degrees Fahrenheit),131 legis-
lators in the 1960s may not have realized what they were 
committing themselves to by outlawing discrimination “on the ba-
sis of sex.” But as we gradually came to acknowledge, through 
attitudes that treat discrimination on the basis of sexual orienta-
tion as a form of the sort of sex stereotyping that is at the heart 
of sex discrimination, the consequences of a commitment not to 
discriminate on the basis of sex became clear. In other words, we 
can be thought to have made progress in understanding what ap-
plication of the concept “sex” in Title VII entails, in just the same 
way that metallurgical experts’ progress in understanding the 
properties of copper entails an evolving set of inferential conse-
quences of application of that concept. 
A gameplayer can also count as having made use of a concept 
even if she does not grasp or endorse all of the inferential conse-
quences of the concept in question. As Professor Jeremy Wanderer 
describes, one can analogize this to playing a game of soccer with 
a child.132 A child who merely runs around a soccer field but who 
shows no interest in the ball and seems to have absolutely no grasp 
of any rules of soccer will not be taken as making any soccer- 
playing moves. But at some point, even a rudimentary grasp of the 
concept of soccer will be judged as soccer playing by observers.133 
That is, if the child knows to kick the ball, not to handle it with her 
hands, and that the touch lines mark the boundaries of the field, 
etc., then the child’s activity can genuinely count as playing soccer. 
Furthermore, this is true even if the child does not subjectively en-
dorse all sorts of inferential consequences of soccer playing: that 
the ball cannot be passed to a teammate in an offside position, for 
example. Observers (scorekeepers) who take the child to be playing 
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soccer but who themselves have a better knowledge of the rules 
and requirements of the game will recognize inferential conse-
quences of the child’s soccer-playing activity that extend beyond 
the child’s own grasp of the concept.134 Nevertheless, we can still 
think of the child soccer player’s activity as involved in a determi-
nate, objective enterprise of soccer playing.  
As Wanderer describes, the child partakes of a concept that 
is external to her, with implications that exceed her grasp.135 We 
might think that future metallurgical experts, or future legal 
scholars, stand in much the same relation to us that the more 
soccer-knowledgeable observers stand in to the child soccer 
player. From that as-yet-unspecified future perspective, we likely 
make mistakes about how we apply the concepts “molybdenum” 
or “sex discrimination.” We likely endorse things that we will 
come to recognize as wrong and fail to see inferential implications 
of those concepts that appear obvious to future observers. But we 
can still count as applying, making use of, the same public con-
cepts.136 We need not say that the child soccer player is actually 
playing soccerchild while mistakenly being evaluated by reference 
to the inferential standards of regulation soccer. But that means 
that the inferential consequences of a commitment not to discrim-
inate on the basis of “sex” are similarly not up to us. They evolve 
as our perspective changes and as we move from our childlike 
grasp of the concepts in question to the perspective of more ma-
ture observers. 
There is also good reason to think that “sex” as discussed in 
originalist judicial opinions on Title VII cannot be a particular 
sexlegal, a concept different in kind from our ordinary term “sex.” 
Sykes appeals explicitly to “original public meaning” and “com-
mon, ordinary usage” and cites to public, nonspecialized diction-
aries.137 Posner discusses the “three flavors” of statutory interpre-
tation in connection with “ordinary discourse,” and he concedes 
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that “even today if asked what is the sex of plaintiff Hively one 
would answer that she is female or that she is a woman, not that 
she is a lesbian.”138 Both Sykes and Posner thus connect their rea-
soning with ordinary, public understandings of the concept in 
question. This sort of appeal to public understandings implies 
that our understanding of correct or incorrect application of “sex 
discrimination” in Hively ought to follow our general understand-
ings of how that concept becomes contentful. Brandomian infer-
entialism suggests that “sex discrimination” has content by virtue 
of its inferential consequences. If Sykes and Posner meant to ap-
ply a more narrowly localized understanding of “sex discrimina-
tion” (perhaps one held fixed by originalist scorekeeping heuris-
tic), then their emphasis on ordinary concept use is misplaced. On 
a Brandomian understanding, ordinary concepts are ones that 
(may) have inferential consequences that exceed our current 
grasp of the concept, and thus there is nothing in principle incom-
patible with our appreciation of the inferential consequences of a 
given concept changing over time. Indeed, perhaps the only way 
to be sure that a concept’s meaning did not change over time 
would be to define it in some narrowly local way, but that ap-
proach contrasts with Sykes and Posner’s presentation of their 
analysis as ordinary or public. 
It is certainly easier to animate a more localized, narrow un-
derstanding of the concept in question for a legal issue that in-
volves something that is unambiguously a term of art—like the 
discussion of “recess appointments” in Noel Canning.139 There, it 
is pretty clear that the game being played, the concept being de-
ployed, was created by and for lawyers engaged in legal reason-
ing. Because the term is so clearly localized and because it makes 
no real claims on broader, more public concepts, it becomes 
harder to tell a story about how the true inferential reach of the 
concept exceeds the grasp of those who invented and use it. But 
it is not impossible to do so. The concept is determined by the in-
ferential connections that link it to other concepts. These connec-
tions are clarified through use—actual applications of the concept 
and judgments about its use in certain situations as proper or im-
proper. So the meaning of the concept will almost certainly be 
clarified and modified as these inferential connections are made 
clear. There may be local normative constraints on scorekeeping 
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activity that inform how those judgments are made, but by defi-
nition on an inferentialist model the actual meaning of the con-
cept will undergo change as it is applied. Even on this localized 
understanding, meaning still emerges from the relationships in 
the apperceptive inferential web of concepts—no concept is truly 
an island. 
Moreover, it is harder to tell this kind of story for Title VII, 
whose drafters chose to use concepts like “sex” with very public 
meanings and uses rather than to expressly define a legal term of 
art. For this reason, a localized legal reading loses force as applied 
to Hively in particular. 
In sum, Brandom’s inferentialism shares a general affinity 
with the sort of dynamic interpretive techniques used to support 
broader understandings of sex discrimination. While those 
opinions may not draw explicitly on these semantic ideas, 
Brandom provides one possible way to tell the dynamic-meaning 
story without resorting to “judicial interpretive updating” 
rationales. Brandom’s inferentialism also gives us reasons to 
think that originalism is not a built-in feature of our activity as 
concept users and that, as an optional normative constraint on 
scorekeeping activity, it gains force only to the extent that it is a 
useful vocabulary for helping us get what we want—in other 
words, originalism is swallowed up by a broader pragmatism. 
This contrasts with the standard originalist view—that original 
public meaning or some similar source of evidence provides a 
semantic, as opposed to merely pragmatic, constraint on 
interpretive activity.140 
Brandom’s philosophy provides us with reasons to think that, 
to the extent that law makes use of public concepts, those con-
cepts will evolve in accord with the scorekeeping activity of ordi-
nary concept users. New applications of terms, new judgments 
about the correctness or incorrectness of the inferential implica-
tions of the concept in question, will affect the meaning of those 
concepts that the law deploys. This is also true for local legal 
terms of art, but it takes on heightened significance for broader 
public concepts given the array of scorekeeping activities that 
have the potential to affect those concepts’ inferential role. 
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B. Democracy and Constraint 
One concern we might have about a Brandomian interpretive 
method is how it interacts with democratic values. As Sykes ex-
plains in her Hively dissent, we might worry that judicial recog-
nition of a changed statutory meaning is best thought of as legis-
lation from the bench.141 This is why Sykes decries the majority’s 
ruling in Hively as (borrowing Posner’s phrase) “[j]udicial statu-
tory updating” that “assume[s] the power to alter the original 
public meaning of a statute through the process of interpretation, 
[which is] a power that is not [the court’s].”142 
But Sykes’s criticism misses the mark as applied to the  
Brandomian conception of judicial interpretive activity. What 
Sykes criticizes is an activist judiciary, one that actively “updates” 
or “rewrites” statutes according to its own preferences. But this 
one-sided conception of the Brandomian interpreter is a caricature. 
Rather than privileging judicial “making” of the meanings of legal 
concepts over Sykes’s preferred “finding,” the Brandomian picture 
suggests that this dualism is inadequate—judges (and all score-
keepers) are always both finding the concepts they employ to be 
rationally determinate through elaboration of a pattern of appro-
priate and inappropriate use and making them so through the pro-
cess of tracing out a recollective reconstruction of the concept’s con-
tent. Judges in this picture are still beholden to standards of 
correct and incorrect application of concepts that are formally de-
terminate, and those standards are informed by the patterns of li-
censed and sanctioned application of concepts that the judge recog-
nizes. Judges in this way remain constrained on the Brandomian 
picture, but the constraint is exercised by a broader class of infor-
mation (the recognized web of inferential connections that hold 
among legal concepts) than on Sykes’s original public meaning 
originalism picture of interpretive activity. 
Perhaps the originalist will respond that constraint by the 
recognized web of inferential connections that hold among legal 
concepts fails to constrain much at all. Indeed, as Part IV.C dis-
cusses, the Brandomian account as this Comment understands it 
does instruct the judge to look to a much broader class of infor-
mation than traditional theories of interpretation. But the funda-
mental point remains that judges on the Brandomian picture are 
not actively substituting their own preferred legal concepts for 
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those to be found in the statutes enacted by Congress. Rather, 
judges still try to remain faithful to the concepts employed by 
Congress while at the same time recognizing that those concepts 
are themselves given semantic content by the real-world process 
of application by language users. The Brandomian approach here 
is no less democratic than the original public meaning original-
ist’s—neither approach gives special pride of place to the inten-
tions or thoughts of individual democratic actors. In both ap-
proaches, the text that is actually enacted controls, regardless of 
its democratic popularity.143 But the Brandomian acknowledges 
that the concepts employed in statutes, while controlling, are 
themselves controlled by actual linguistic activity—the approved 
and sanctioned applications of the concept that provide the mate-
rial from which the Brandomian scorekeeper rationally recon-
structs the concept’s meaning. To return to an earlier example, 
the Brandomian evaluating the meaning of a child’s playing soc-
cer is bound to recognize that playing soccer entails respecting 
the offsides rule regardless of the interpreter’s views on the desir-
ability of such a rule. The public nature of the concept in question 
thus works both ways: just as children playing soccer are bound 
by offsides whether they acknowledge it or not, so too the score-
keeper evaluating soccer playing is bound to acknowledge the off-
sides rule as binding. The bindingness of offsides is up to neither 
an individual gameplayer nor an individual scorekeeper. 
Recognizing the necessity of fidelity to actual concept use is 
part of a general shift to a world in which “semantics must answer 
to pragmatics”144—where semantics helps make sense of the ac-
tual actions of language users. The bedrock of Brandom’s inferen-
tialism is actual linguistic practice: how concepts are actually de-
ployed in language. It is from this actual use of language that we 
get the circumstances of correct and incorrect inferential conse-
quences that give inferentialism its force. The web of inferential 
connections that is constitutive of inferential meaning is not 
static—it does not dictate terms to the use of concepts always and 
forever. Rather the web is dynamic, reweaving to accommodate 
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the significance of new information supplied by new licensed or 
unlicensed deployment of concepts in particular circumstances. 
And if this is our model of conceptual change, then judges, 
not legislators, are the institutional actors best situated to do the 
incremental, sensitive work of tracing out inferential commit-
ments. Such activity, consistent with Brandom’s legal analogy, 
looks like the sort of common-law concept elaboration that judges 
engage in rather routinely. Sykes, in Hively, wants to draw a line 
between “common-law statutes” like the Sherman Act and ordi-
nary judicial work that is “interpretive only.”145 But Brandom’s 
general account of conceptual activity suggests that it makes no 
sense to attempt to draw such a line: all concepts are to be seen 
as responsive to the real-world implications of application to new 
circumstances and of changes in what is taken among language 
users to be proper and improper use of the concept. The only dif-
ference is the speed with which the community applies shifting 
norms of correct or incorrect concept application, but the judiciary 
remains sensitive to the changing circumstances of application 
regardless. That is, it may be that some concepts, as deployed by 
language users on the ground, change more quickly than others 
in terms of what usages language users recognize as correct or 
incorrect, but all semantic content will be sensitive to and shift 
along with those on-the-ground changes. 
Sykes ends her dissent by asserting that “[t]he court’s new 
liability rule is entirely judge-made; it does not derive from the 
text of Title VII in any meaningful sense.”146 Applying Brandom, 
dynamic statutory interpretation can have it both ways in just the 
sense that Sykes denies here. Brandom shows us how to think of 
judges as in some sense “making”—actively tracing out a rational 
reconstruction that reveals the inferential connections of a con-
cept in question—but also how to think of the meaning that re-
sults as faithful to the statutory text. And that occurs because the 
statutory text itself, its semantic content, must further be faithful 
to the pragmatic doings of the relevant linguistic community. The 
applications of the concept in question, the real-world judgments 
about proper or improper application, are themselves the fodder 
that constitutes the meaning of a concept. And a judge’s careful 
attention to the changes in those applications is therefore faithful 
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to the text in that it recognizes that the text and the concepts it 
employs must answer to the world. 
When we learn more about “copper” (when we recognize new 
consequences of applying the concept “copper”), a scorekeeper’s 
inferential accounting of sentences involving the concept will 
change to accommodate that progress. So too, when we learn 
about a concept like “sex discrimination,” a diligent scorekeeper 
will update her books accordingly. Learning more about copper or 
sex discrimination is just recognizing new inferential conse-
quences of deploying those concepts, recognizing new applications 
of those concepts as appropriate or inappropriate. Thinking of 
judges as faithful to text therefore need not mean cutting judges 
off from the changing thoughts and behaviors of the very linguis-
tic community whose activity gives concepts their inferential 
shape. Legal concepts will not achieve this sort of faithfulness to 
the pragmatic doings of individuals all on their own: there is no 
self-enforcing mechanism to ensure that changes in how a linguis-
tic community thinks about a concept will be applied in a partic-
ular case. That requires the diligent work of a scorekeeper sensi-
tive enough to those changes to recognize them in her own 
scorekeeping activity. 
C. “Doing” Brandomian Interpretation 
For all their flaws, one of the benefits of the most popular 
forms of originalism is that they give relatively clear instructions 
to the interpreter. Original public meaning interpretation entails 
a discernable task: try to figure out what an individual using a 
particular word at a particular point in history is likely to have 
meant by it. Purposivism, too, gives the interpreter relatively 
clear marching orders: understand the motivating purpose be-
hind a statute and act consistently with that animating spirit. 
Brandomian semantics, by contrast, asks the interpreter to 
do something much messier and much less amenable to clear in-
structions: consult and understand the web of permissible and 
impermissible inferential connections that obtain among concepts 
and apply concepts so as to be consistent with that understand-
ing. There is, consequently, no silver bullet, no magic source to 
guide the task of Brandomian interpretation. There is only the 
attempt to reason well about concepts and to make a web of con-
cepts cohere with the ways that concepts are actually deployed, 
licitly and illicitly, in the world, by language users. 
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So if, over the years, we as language users begin to 
acknowledge that there is such a thing as workplace sexual  
harassment, that women can be attracted to women, that those 
same women have a right to marry women, that biases surround-
ing sexual orientation are just as engrained and pernicious as 
other sex or gender stereotypes, and a hundred other, more nu-
anced things besides, then the base of examples from which the 
Brandomian draws her interpretive lessons will have changed. 
These changes in how people deploy concepts, and which applica-
tions of concepts in which situations they recognize as appropri-
ate, will change the meaning of those concepts themselves. Those 
changes give the concept a new inferential shape with which the 
Brandomian will try to make her interpretation cohere. 
An example may help to clarify. Consider another case related 
to how the law affects gay people: Morrissey v United States.147 The 
case involves a homosexual male taxpayer who sought to deduct as 
medical care expenses the costs related to in vitro fertilization 
(IVF).148 Professor Joseph Morrissey, the taxpayer, chose to pursue 
the costly IVF treatments because he wanted a child but was una-
ble to conceive one with his chosen partner.149 The case turned on 
a matter of statutory interpretation—the correct reading of 26 USC 
§ 213(d)’s definition of “medical care” as “amounts paid . . . for the 
diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease, or 
for the purpose of affecting any structure or function of the body.”150 
The question in the case was whether the IVF treatments were for 
the purpose of affecting a “function” of Morrissey’s body.151 The 
Eleventh Circuit cited dictionary definitions of key terms,152 look-
ing to the “plain meaning” of the statutory text. It concluded that 
the “function” of Morrissey’s sex organs was to produce healthy 
sperm.153 Because the IVF treatments did not affect that function, 
the deduction was denied.154 
For an inferentialist, the scope of this inquiry can be 
broadened because the question “What is our best understanding 
of what it means for a biological system to have a function?” 
admits more nuance and a greater body of evidence than do the 
 
 147 871 F3d 1260 (11th Cir 2017). 
 148 Id at 1263. 
 149 Id. 
 150 Id at 1264, citing 26 USC § 213(d). 
 151 Morrissey, 871 F3d at 1264–68. 
 152 Id at 1265. 
 153 Id at 1267. 
 154 Id at 1272. 
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questions “What do contemporaneous dictionaries define 
‘function’ to mean?” or “What does the legislative history reveal 
the legislators who passed this statute to have understood 
biological ‘function’ to mean?” The relevant question of what 
constitutes a “function of the body” may perhaps be informed by 
dictionary definitions, but the overarching goal is to apply our 
best understanding of the concept “function” in the context of 
human biology. For that, we can look not only to dictionary 
definitions but also to philosophical and scientific thought that 
attempt to systematically describe what it is for a biological 
structure to have a “function” or to function properly.155 
Furthermore, such robust engagement may indeed compel the 
same conclusion reached by the court in Morrissey. But the point 
here is to emphasize that interpretation on the Brandomian view 
is not reducible to neat and tidy reference to a single type of 
evidence. It requires broad engagement with the circumstances of 
appropriate application of a concept like “biological function” that 
goes beyond definition of “function” from Webster’s. That 
engagement is likely to bring in leading work from biology, 
philosophy, sociology, or any number of other disciplines that 
define the norms of appropriate application of the concepts used 
in statutory language. 
Here, originalist fears about a lack of constraint on judicial 
interpretive activity likely emerge. If interpretation requires such 
a broad and varied inquiry, there would seem to be a lot of room 
for judges to steer that inquiry toward favored outcomes. But if 
we are willing to assume bad faith on the part of judges, then it 
seems just as possible to worry that there is room in consultation 
of original sources, or of legislative records, for judges to steer 
originalist interpretive inquiries in just the same way.156 Of 
course, even if judges are not operating in bad faith, they may 
nevertheless simply be bad at doing the work of Brandomian in-
ferentialist scorekeeping (or at least worse at the Brandomian in-
 
 155 I refer here principally to the work of philosophers like Professor Ruth Millikan, 
who attempts to develop a naturalized account of biological function tied to evolutionarily 
selected-for traits. See generally Ruth Garrett Millikan, Language, Thought, and Other 
Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism (MIT 1984). This turns out to be an 
extremely complicated question, and full engagement with it is beyond the scope of this 
Comment. 
 156 See generally, for example, Lockhart v United States, 136 S Ct 958 (2016) (featur-
ing application of different originalist statutory techniques in both the majority and dis-
senting opinions). 
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ferentialist task than they are at originalist tasks). But we al-
ready ask judges to do all sorts of complicated and varied things 
when exercising their judgment or interpreting statutes. Judges’ 
experience consulting a wide array of evidence ought to give us 
comfort that they are up to the task of carefully tracing inferential 
consequences among a wide array of concepts in the way that 
Brandom’s scorekeeping requires.  
The opinions in Obergefell, for example, acknowledge 
changed attitudes toward gay and lesbian people in just the way 
that inferentialism suggests that they ought to take note of how 
concepts are being applied on the ground.157 Judges are also asked 
to review cost-benefit analyses,158 evaluate scientific evidence,159 
consider psychological claims,160 and confront challenges posed by 
advancing technology.161 We also ask judges to evaluate the com-
peting empirical claims of litigants and their amici, who may cite 
contradictory or false scholarship.162 It is not clear that asking 
judges to do careful historical analysis to identify “original public 
meaning”163 is any less demanding than asking judges to carefully 
evaluate other sources and the present use of concepts in ques-
tion. While the task of originalist interpretation may be easier to 
state succinctly, it requires substantial and rigorous investiga-
tion. Judges are capable of careful and detailed thought about a 
given statutory term or legal concept.  
This Comment suggests that, consistent with a Brandomian 
view, statutory analysis should be directed at sources that go be-
yond those contemporaneous with a statute’s passage. There may 
be a range of relevant evidence to consider when evaluating the 
 
 157 See Obergefell, 135 S Ct at 2596. 
 158 See, for example, Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association of the United States, 
Inc v State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co, 463 US 29, 53–56 (1983) (evaluating 
costs and benefits of seat belt regulations). 
 159 See, for example, Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc, 509 US 579, 592–
93 (1993) (“Faced with a proffer of expert scientific testimony . . . the trial judge . . . must 
make a preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the 
testimony is scientifically valid and whether that reasoning properly can be applied to the 
facts in issue.”). 
 160 See, for example, Brown v Board of Education of Topeka, 347 US 483, 494 n 11 
(1954) (citing to detrimental psychological effects of segregation). 
 161 See, for example, Carpenter v United States, 138 S Ct 2206, 2214–16 (2018). 
 162 See Allison Orr Larsen, The Trouble with Amicus Facts, 100 Va L Rev 1757, 1784–
1808 (2014). 
 163 See, for example, the historical analysis in Michael H. v Gerald D., 491 US 110, 
124–27 (1989). If judges are capable of tracing conceptions of the unitary family through 
centuries of common-law doctrine, then they are probably capable of taking stock of how 
those conceptions stand in the present day. 
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present inferential shape of a given concept (such as the subse-
quent judicial rulings and evolving understanding of sex and gen-
der that motivated the Hively majority’s analysis), and it is diffi-
cult in advance of any specific question to identify what sort of 
evidence will be relevant to an inquiry about what constitutes the 
best modern understanding of a legal concept. Perhaps, then, 
Brandomian statutory interpretation would not be easier than 
more familiar originalist methods, but any method of statutory 
interpretation will require rigor and sophistication of judicial in-
terpreters. What’s more, Brandom’s semantics gives us an ac-
count for how a judicial finding of changed statutory meaning can 
be more than an unconstrained and unprincipled exercise of 
power. 
This lack of a user-friendly “method” for Brandomian inter-
pretation is a drawback compared to more familiar interpretive 
methods, but I want to close by mentioning one comparative ad-
vantage. What Brandomian interpretation lacks in simplicity it 
compensates for in hope. Brandom’s semantics gives us a skeleton 
on which we can build a meaningfully and rationally dynamic in-
terpretive theory. It grounds dynamic interpretation in such a 
way as to keep at bay worries about judges merely “rewriting” 
statutes, merely exercising power in law’s name. It tells a story 
about how the meanings of statutes respond to changes in the 
world. And that story implies that some as-yet unrealized 
changes in the behavior of language users (citizens) can force le-
gal concepts into conformity with a web of inferential conse-
quences hitherto unseen. And that means that there is hope for 
that future web to be more beautiful and more just than any we 
have yet imagined. 
CONCLUSION 
Law, like all discursive (concept-wielding) activity, must 
reckon with semantics. The semantics developed in this Comment 
is normative and rational. That normativity is spelled out in 
terms of a social, temporal practice of linguistic gameplaying—of 
asserting and scorekeeping in communities and through time. 
That rationality is elaborated in inferential terms—fundamental 
to the account are the inferential consequences that constitute the 
space of reasons that give concepts meaning. Thinking about se-
mantics this way yields a view of concepts as dynamic rather than 
fixed, containing content that exceeds our grasp of that content, 
and created both by the making/authoritative activity of language 
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users and the finding/rule-governed administration of that au-
thority by other and future scorekeepers. It gives us a way to 
think of Judge Posner’s three flavors not as discrete interpretive 
options but potentially as aspects of a broader, multifaceted dis-
cursive practice that is the Brandomian inferentialist game of giv-
ing and asking for reasons. Judges, like all concept-users, are par-
ticipants in this game, and this Comment suggests that reasoning 
through the structure of that game gives us a new perspective on 
their dual role within it. 
